Tuesday, September 22, 2015

Who was Aristotle ????






Greek philosopher. A pupil of Plato, the tutor of Alexander the Great, and the author of works on logic, metaphysics, ethics, natural sciences, politics, and poetics, he profoundly influenced Western thought. In his philosophical system, which led him to criticize what he saw as Plato's metaphysical excesses, theory follows empirical observation and logic, based on the syllogism, is the essential method of rational inquiry.Influenced by his father, the physician Nicomachus, Aristotle developed an early interest in science. As a student of Plato he formed a love of philosophy and logic. He then became the tutor to Alexander of Macedon (later Alexander the Great). After Alexander became king, Aristotle returned to Athens, where he founded his own school, known formally as the Lyceum and less formally as the Peripatetic ("walking around") school, because students followed their teacher as he walked in the garden. Aristotle is considered the father of biology. Alexander the Great became his patron, funding his work and arranging for Aristotle to receive samples of plants and animals from all corners of the Alexandrian empire. Ancient scholars attributed as many as 400 treatises to Aristotle, encompassing all knowledge in Antiquity about the universe. About 30 have survived and these are thought to have been compiled by his students.Greek philosopher and scientist whose thought determined the course of Western intellectual history for two millenia. He was the son of the court physician to Amyntas III, grandfather of Alexander the Great. In 367 he became a student at the Academy of Plato in Athens; he remained there for 20 years. After Plato's death in 348/347, he returned to Macedonia, where he became tutor to the young Alexander. In 335 he founded his own school in Athens, the Lyceum. His intellectual range was vast, covering most of the sciences and many of the arts. He worked in physics, chemistry, biology, zoology, and botany; in psychology, political theory, and ethics; in logic and metaphysics; and in history, literary theory, and rhetoric. He invented the study of formal logic, devising for it a finished system, known as syllogistic, that was considered the sum of the discipline until the 19th century; his work in zoology, both observational and theoretical, also was not surpassed until the 19th century. His ethical and political theory, especially his conception of the ethical virtues and of human flourishing (“happiness”), continue to exert great influence in philosophical debate. He wrote prolifically; his major surviving works include the Organon, De Anima (“On the Soul”), Physics,

Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics, Magna Moralia, Politics,
Rhetoric, and Poetics, as well as other works on natural history and science.

Life 


Aristotle's father, Nicomachus, was a noted physician. Aristotle studied (367–347 B.C.) under Plato at the Academy and there wrote many dialogues that were praised for their eloquence. Only fragments of these dialogues are extant. He tutored (342–c.339

B.C.) Alexander the Great at the Macedonian court, left to live in Stagira, and then returned to Athens. In 335 B.C. he opened a school in the Lyceum; some distinguished members of the Academy followed him. His practice of lecturing in the Lyceum's portico, or covered walking place (peripatos), gave his school the name Peripatetic. During the anti-Macedonian agitation after Alexander's death, Aristotle fled in 323
B.C. to Chalcis, where he died.

Works 

Aristotle's extant writings consist largely of his written versions of his lectures; some passages appear to be interpolations of notes made by his students; the texts were edited and given their present form by Andronicus of Rhodes in the 1st cent. B.C. Chief among them are the Organum, consisting of six treatises on logic; Physics;

Metaphysics; De Anima [on the soul]; Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics; De
Poetica [poetics]; Rhetoric; and a series of works on biology and physics. In the late 19th cent. his Constitution of Athens, an account of Athenian government, was found.

Aristotle (Greek: Ἀριστοτέλης Aristotélēs) (384 BCE – March 7, 322 BCE) was an

ancient Greek philosopher, a student of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great. He wrote on diverse subjects, including physics, poetry, biology and zoology, logic,
rhetoric, politics and government, and ethics. Along with Socrates and Plato, Aristotle was one of the most influential of ancient Greek philosophers. They transformed
Presocratic Greek philosophy into the foundations of Western philosophy as we know it. Some consider Plato and Aristotle to have founded two of the most important schools of Ancient philosophy; others consider Aristotelianism as a development and concretization of Plato's insights. Although Aristotle wrote dialogues, only fragments of these have survived. The works that have survived are in treatise form and were, for the most part, unpublished texts. These are generally thought to be lecture notes or texts used by his students. Among the most important are Physics, Metaphysics (or Ontology), Nicomachean
Ethics, Politics, De Anima (On the Soul) and Poetics. These works, although connected in many fundamental ways, differ significantly in both style and substance. Aristotle was a polymath. He not only studied almost every subject possible at the time, but made significant contributions to most of them. In science, Aristotle studied
anatomy, astronomy, economics, embryology, geography, geology, meteorology,
physics, and zoology. In philosophy, Aristotle wrote on aesthetics, ethics, government,
metaphysics, politics, psychology, rhetoric and theology. He also dealt with education, foreign customs, literature and poetry. His combined works practically constitute an
encyclopedia of Greek knowledge.






Sunday, September 20, 2015

Who was Plato???????

Plato

Plato Biography

Born: c. 427 B.C.E. 
Athens, Greece 
Died: c. 347 B.C.E. 
Athens, Greece 

Greek philosopher
The Greek philosopher Plato founded the Academy in Athens, one of the great philosophical schools of antiquity

(ancient times). His thought had enormous impact on the development of Western (having to do with American and European thought) philosophy.

Early life

Plato was born in Athens, Greece, the son of Ariston and Perictione, both of Athenian noble backgrounds. He lived his whole life in Athens, although he traveled to Sicily and southern Italy on several occasions. One story says he traveled to Egypt. Little is known of his early years, but he was given the finest education Athens had to offer noble families, and he devoted his considerable talents to politics and the writing of tragedy (works that end with death and sadness) and other forms of poetry. His acquaintance withSocrates (c. 469–c. 399 B.C.E. ) altered the course of his life. The power that Socrates's methods and arguments had over the minds of the youth of Athens gripped Plato as firmly as it did many others, and he became a close associate of Socrates.
The end of the Peloponnesian War (431–04 B.C.E. ), which caused the destruction of Athens by the Spartans, left Plato in a terrible position. His uncle, Critias (c. 480–403 B.C.E. ), was the leader of the Thirty Tyrants (a group of ruthless Athenian rulers) who were installed in power by the victorious Spartans. One means of holding onto power was to connect as many Athenians as possible with terrible acts committed during the war. Thus Socrates, as we learn in Plato's Apology, was ordered to arrest a man and bring him to Athens from Salamis for execution (to be put to death). When the great teacher refused, his life was threatened, and he was probably saved only by the overthrow of the Thirty Tyrants and the reestablishment of the democracy (a system of government in which government officials are elected by the people).

Death of Socrates

Plato welcomed the restoration of the democracy, but his mistrust was deepened some four years later when Socrates was tried on false charges and sentenced to death. Plato was present at the trial, as we learn in the Apology, but was not present when the hemlock (poison) was given to his master, although he describes the scene in clear and touching detail in the Phaedo. He then turned in disgust from Athenian politics and never took an active part in government, although through friends he did try to influence the course of political life in the Sicilian city of Syracuse.
Plato and several of his friends withdrew from Athens for a short time after Socrates's death and remained with Euclides (c. 450–373 B.C.E. ) in Megara. His productive years were highlighted by three voyages to Sicily, and his writings, all of which have survived.
The first trip, to southern Italy and Syracuse, took place in 388 and 387 B.C.E. , when Plato met Dionysius I (c. 430–367 B.C.E. ). Dionysius was then at the height of his power in Sicily for having freed the Greeks there from the threat of Carthaginian rule. Plato became better friends with the philosopher Dion (c. 408–353 B.C.E. ), however, and Dionysius grew jealous and began to treat Plato harshly.

His dialogues

When Plato returned to Athens, he began to teach in the Gymnasium Academe and soon afterward acquired property nearby and founded his famous Academy, which survived until the early sixth century C.E. At the center of the Academy stood a shrine to the Muses (gods of the arts), and at least one modern scholar suggests that the Academy may have been a type of religious brotherhood.
Plato had begun to write the dialogues (writings in the form of conversation), which came to be the basis of his philosophical (having to do with the search for knowledge and truth) teachings, some years before the founding of the Academy. To this early period Plato wrote the Laches which deals with courage, Charmides with common sense, Euthyphro with piety (religious dedication), Lysis with friendship, Protagoras with the teaching of virtues, or goodness, and many others. The Apology and Critostand somewhat apart from the other works of this group in that they deal with historical events, Socrates's trial and the period between his conviction and execution.
Plato's own great contributions begin to appear in the second group of writings, which date from the period between his first and second voyages to Sicily. The Menocarries on the question of the teachability of virtue first dealt with in Protagoras and introduces the teaching of anamnesis (recollection), which plays an important role in Plato's view of the human's ability to learn the truth.

The Republic

Socrates is again the main character in the Republic, although this work is less a dialogue than a long discussion by Socrates of justice and what it means to the individual and the city-state (independent states). Just as there are three elements to the soul, the rational, the less rational, and the impulsive irrational, so there are three classes in the state, the rulers, the guardians, and the workers. The rulers are not a family of rulers but are made up of those who have emerged from the population as a whole as the most gifted intellectually. The guardians serve society by keeping order and by handling the practical matters of government, including fighting wars, while the workers perform the labor necessary to keep the whole running smoothly. Thus the most rational elements of the city-state guide it and see that all in it are given an education equal to their abilities.
Only when the three work in harmony, with intelligence clearly in control, does the individual or state achieve the happiness and fulfillment of which it is capable. TheRepublic ends with the great myth of Er, in which the wanderings of the soul through births and rebirths are retold. One may be freed from the cycle after a time through lives of greater and greater spiritual and intellectual purity.

Last years

Plato's third and final voyage to Syracuse was made some time before 357 B.C.E. , and he tried for the second time to influence the young Dionysius II. Plato was unsuccessful and was held in semicaptivity before being released. Plato's Seventh Letter, the only one in the collection of thirteen considered accurate, perhaps even from the hand of Plato himself, recounts his role in the events surrounding the death of Dion, who in 357 B.C.E. entered Syracuse and overthrew Dionysius. It is of more interest, however, for Plato's statement that the deepest truths may not be communicated.
Plato died in 347 B.C.E. the founder of an important philosophical school, which existed for almost one thousand years, and the most brilliant of Socrates's many pupils and followers. His system attracted many followers in the centuries after his death and resurfaced as Neoplatonism, the great rival of early Christianity.

Plato and its (poetry) Republic

Plato and its (poetry) Republic 



Plato’s argument against poetry in Republic 10 is perplexing. He condemns not all poetry, but
only “however much of it is imitative (hosê mimêtikê)” (595a). A metaphysical charge againstcertain works of poetry – that they are forms of imitation, “at a third remove from the truth” – isthus used to justify an ethical charge: that these works cripple our thought and corrupt our souls.Unfortunately, it is not at all clear how to understand the connection between the two charges.We can see how they are related in a loose way: imitators are concerned with images far removedfrom the truth about what they represent (596a-598b); many people are too foolish to distinguishimitation from reality and thus accept ignorant imitators as experts and guides (598c-602b);imitation appeals to and thereby strengthens an inferior part of the soul unconcerned with truth(602c ff); worst of all, the charms of imitation can seduce even those who generally know better(605c-607a). But when we try to make Book 10’s argument more precise, trouble ensues. Platocertainly never spells out the connection between the metaphysics of imitation and the charge ofethical harm. Moreover, he seems in the end (603c ff) to abandon metaphysical considerationsand give a straightforward argument against tragedy and the works of Homer based on theircontent – they represent people behaving immoderately – and psychological effect: as audiencewe weep and wail and behave as immoderately as the characters, and this undermines the order ofour souls. This argument makes no mention of imitation or ignorance or removes from truth;what, then, is the relevance of the metaphysical charge, to which Plato devotes so muchdiscussion?The worry gains more force when we ask how the metaphysical charge could do anywork in the argument – when we notice, that is, how difficult it is to apply Plato’s definition ofimitation to poetry. Plato illustrates what he means by “imitation” with a discussion of painting:the painter is an imitator because he copies material objects like beds instead of Forms, andcopies them not as they are but “as they appear” (598a) – that is, as they look. What is therelevant analogy for the poet? What corresponds to the painter’s bed? And in what sense can thepoet, an artist working in a non-visual medium, copy things “as they appear”? Plato’s answers to1For valuable comments, criticism and discussion I am grateful to Cian Dorr, G.R.F. Ferrari,Alexander Nehamas, Ron Polansky, Nicholas Rescher, Nick Zangwill, and audiences at theUniversity of Pittsburgh and University College Cork.What is Imitative Poetry 2these questions are far from clear, and thus it is hard to know what he means by calling poetryimitative.Furthermore, even if we grant that poetry is somehow analogous to painting and that bothare forms of imitation whose products are “at a third remove from the truth” (599d), why shouldthis render poetry ethically harmful? After all, cannot something “third from the truth” berelevantly similar to the truth? A photograph of a person resembles the person to a high degree; aphotocopy of the photograph resembles the person to a lesser degree. At each stage more detailand precision are lost; nonetheless, it is all a matter of degree – degree of resemblance – andalthough the photograph is a better likeness than the photocopy, common sense says that thephotocopy is still most decidedly a likeness, and will do for many purposes in a fix. If this isright, then imitative poetry should be able to give us something relevantly like the truth abouthuman affairs, and could therefore be a tool of moral education, not its enemy. And while suchthoughts may be more natural to us with our modern tools of accurate reproduction than to theGreeks, Socrates himself seems to have suggested just this point in Book 3’s discussion of poetry:“By making something false as similar to the truth as we can, don’t we make it useful?” (382d).There is, therefore, a major interpretative difficulty with Book 10: it is not at all clearhow the ethical charge that certain works of poetry corrupt the soul depends on the metaphysicalcharge that these works are imitative.2 To find a solution, we will have to give a clear account ofwhat Plato means by ‘imitative.’ In doing so, we will also be offering a solution to a relateddifficulty, one much discussed in the enormous body of literature on Book 10: that Plato licensespoetic imitations of one sort – imitations of virtuous people – in Book 3, but then condemnsimitative poetry as a whole in Book 10.3 To avoid contradiction, Plato must be defining2This problem has not been clearly identified as such in the many books and articles aboutPlato’s critique of poetry, although insightful suggestions that might form the basis for a solutionto it abound: see in particular M.F. Burnyeat “Culture and Society in Plato's Republic,” TannerLectures on Human Values 20 (1999) 215-324, G.R.F. Ferrari, “Plato and Poetry” in G. Kennedyed. The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism Vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1989) 92-148, C. Janaway,Images of Excellence (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) and A. Nehamas “Plato on Imitation andPoetry” in J.M.E. Moravcsik and P. Temko eds. Plato on Beauty, Wisdom and the Arts, (Rowmanand Littlefield, 1982) 47-78, reprinted in A. Nehamas, Virtues of Authenticity: Essays on Platoand Socrates, (Princeton University Press, 1999) 251-278. These writers, however, either leavethe connection between metaphysics and ethics at the level of suggestion or give unsatisfactoryaccounts of the connection (see section 3 below). The account that comes closest to doing thework I think needs doing is E. Belfiore, “Plato’s Greatest Accusation against Poetry” in NewEssays on Plato, Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 9, F.J. Pelletier and J.King-Farlow eds. (1983): 39-62. I note points of comparison between her view and mine below.3Book 3 clearly presents ethically beneficial poetry as engaged in imitation: the “unmixedimitator of the decent person” is admitted into the city (397d), and Plato uses cognates of mimêsisto refer to good poetry and art at 398b, 399a, and 401a.What is Imitative Poetry 3‘imitative’ in Book 10 in a way that excludes faithful imitations of the virtuous. On the account Ioffer, he is doing precisely that: imitative poetry turns out to refer only to be poetry thatmisrepresents human virtue in a dangerous way.In coming to understand the relation between the metaphysical and ethical charges, then,we will gain a better understanding of the argument of Repubic 10, and more generally of Plato’sreasons for condemning the poetry he condemns. We will also discover an important series ofparallels in the distinctions Plato makes between reality and appearances in various fields. Theseparallels will show Plato’s attack on poetry to be intimately connected to his most central ethicaland metaphysical views.I. Visual AppearancesSocrates begins Book 10 by congratulating himself on having excluded all imitative poetry fromthe ideal city, and proposes to explain why such poetry is dangerous by way of a generaldiscussion of imitation (mimêsis). A large part of the ensuing discussion is concerned with visualphenomena: first mirror-reflections of the sun, plants, animals, and artifacts, then paintings ofbeds and bridles, then optical illusions. Although Socrates later warns against relying exclusivelyon the analogy with painting (603b), he clearly intends the discussion of painting and other visualphenomena to provide us with an understanding of imitation, and thereby to help in explainingwhat imitative poetry is and why it is dangerous. Let us consider the discussion with this point inmind.The analysis of imitation begins with the premise that for each class of material objects
there is single immaterial Form, of which the many material particulars are likenesses;4 thus amaterial bed is a likeness of the Form of the Bed, which is the true bed, the bed that really is.5Then Plato considers a painting, a visual imitation, of a particular bed. The painting is a likenessof the material bed, itself a likeness of the true bed; therefore the painting is a likeness of alikeness of the original, thrice removed from “the nature” and “the truth” (597e). But it is naturalto think, as I argued above, that a likeness of a likeness may still resemble the original; surely apainting of a bed, for example, captures something, although not all, of the nature of beds.This, however, is decidedly not the way Plato thinks of imitation, and to understand whywe must attend to a further ontological distinction that he makes, one far more central to the4The material bed is “something which is like (hoion)” the Form (597a); Plato suggests thatperceptible things are likenesses or images of Forms throughout Republic 6-7.5Does Plato really hold that there are Forms of artifacts like beds, or is his discussion here purelyheuristic? My own view is that he posits the Form of the Bed chiefly for the sake of the analogywith the ethical Forms at issue in poetry. I explain the analogy below.What is Imitative Poetry 4argument than has generally been noticed. This is the distinction between particular materialobjects on the one hand and their appearances on the other.The painter copies particular beds, not the Form of the bed. But “does he copy them asthey are,” Socrates asks, “or as they appear (hoia estin ê hoia phainetai)? For you must make thisfurther distinction (touto gar eti diorison)” (598a).6 He explains the distinction as follows: as onemoves around a bed, viewing it from different angles, “the bed does not differ at all from itself,but it appears to be different” (598a). I propose that Plato’s analysis of imitation makes mostsense if we take this passage to distinguish not between two ways of considering one and thesame object – as it is vs. as it appears from any particular perspective – but rather between twodistinct objects, the bed itself and the appearance of the bed. The painter copies “not what is, as itis” – here referring not to the Form, but to the material bed, for this is within the scope of the“further distinction”7 – but rather something different: “what appears (to phainomenon), as itappears.” His painting is “an imitation of a phantom (phantasmatos)” rather than of the truth(598b); he captures “only a small bit (smikron ti)” of his subject, “and that a mere image(eidôlon)” (598b).8 In other words, the appearance of a bed – what the painter paints – is nearlyas far “removed from truth” as the painting of a bed: both are mere images of the particular bed(and therefore copies of copies of the Form). And indeed Book 10 makes no distinction inontological level at all between appearance and artist’s image. Plato refers to the appearances theimitator copies, as well as the images the imitator produces, as mere phantoms – phainomena,phantasmata, and eidôla.9 (Is Plato here making a point only about what aspect of things thepainter paints, or a more general point about what is available for perception? Some take him tobe laying the ground for the theory of perception propounded by Russell and others in the last6Translations tend to obscure the force of touto gar eti diorison: Grube/Reeve has “You must beclear about that;” Jowett has “You have still to determine this.” Bloom translates as Irecommend.7Cf. J. Adam, The Republic of Plato, 2 volumes (Cambridge, 1902), vol. 2 394.8Contrast eidôlon, which often connotes falsehood, with the more neutral eikôn, used to refer toimages elsewhere in the Republic (e.g. Book 3, 401b ff). As Halliwell points out, Plato abandons“the standard, non-prejudicial term” eikôn in Book 10 (S. Halliwell, Republic 10 (Aris & Phillips,1988) at 118).9These words refer to the artist’s work at 599a, 599d, 601b, and 605c, and to the thing imitated at598b, 598b, 598b, and 600e. As Nehamas puts it, this overlap of vocabulary “suggests that he isthinking of the object of imitation and of the product of imitation as being the same object – if notin number, at least in type. It almost seems as if he believes that the painter lifts the surface offthe subject and transplants it onto the painting” (Nehamas, “Plato on Imitation and Poetry,” 263).What is Imitative Poetry 5century: we see material objects like beds only indirectly, for between us and them intervenes alayer of sense-data, immaterial entities which are the direct objects of perception.)10Thus far we have seen an argument that the appearance of a bed is ontologically distinctfrom the particular bed itself, and therefore that in copying the appearance, the painter fails tocopy the bed. But this by no means entails that the painter gets the bed wrong. After all, theappearance of a bed certainly looks like a bed, for a bed’s “look” is precisely its visible aspect, itsappearance. But Plato has shown us that the appearance is not only distinct but also qualitativelydifferent from the bed: when viewed from different angles the bed itself remains the same, whilethe appearance of it varies (598a). Now compare this way of distinguishing the apparent bedfrom the material bed with the distinction Plato draws earlier in the Republic, and in otherdialogues, between the apparent (that is, perceptible) world as a whole and a reality of a highergrade:The beautiful itself…remains the same and never in any way tolerates anydiffering (alloiôsin) whatsoever….[but the many beautifuls] never in any wayremain the same as themselves or in relation to each other. (Phaedo 78d-e)11The Form of Beauty is intelligible but not at all perceptible. The “many beautifulthings,” on the other hand, are things that we see, things that are apparent. In this case, then, as inthe case of the bed, what appears is varied, changing and contradictory, while the real is stable,uniform and consistent – the Form absolutely so, and the particular bed relatively to itsappearance. (Here we have a concrete application of Plato’s claim that the relation of the bottom10Note how close Russell is to Republic 10 in giving his case for the existence of sense-data:“Although I believe that the table is ‘really’ of the same colour all over, the parts that reflect thelight look much brighter than the other parts….if I move,…the apparent distribution of colours onthe table will change… a given thing looks different in shape from every different point of view;”and, in this connection, “[T]he painter has to…learn the habit of seeing things as they appear” (B.Russell, Problems of Philosophy (Home University Library, 1912; reprinted Oxford, 1959) at 2-3); compare Republic 598a, quoted above. For a defense of the idea that Plato was a proto-sensedata-theorist, see H.J. Paton, “Plato’s Theory of EIKASIA, Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety XXII (1921-22): 69-104.11Compare the Republic’s first discussion of Forms, in Book 5: “The Form of Beautyitself….always remains the same in all respects (aei men kata tauta hôsautôs ekhousan),” but “ofall the many beautiful things is there any one that will not appear ugly? Or any one of the justthings that will not appear unjust? Or of the pious thing that will not appear impious?…And thebigs and smalls and lights and heavies, will they be called any more what we say they are than theopposite?” (479a-b). The language is similar at Symposium 211a, where Plato offers a fullerexplanation of how it is that each beautiful thing (for example) is in some way ugly. It isnoteworthy for our purposes that each these passages, among the most explicit we have in Platoabout the difference between Forms and particulars, takes to kalon (the beautiful or fine) as itsexample.What is Imitative Poetry 6two sections of Book VI’s divided line to the top two is analogous to the relation of the bottommost to the one above it: “as the opinable is to the knowable [that is, as the perceptible realm is tothe realm of Forms], so the likeness is to the thing that is like” (510a). As the many particular,perceptible beautiful things are to the Beautiful itself, so is the shadow or reflection of a bed tothe bed. And we have seen that Book 10, by treating the appearances of material objects likeimages, adds them to the lowest level of the line alongside shadows and reflections.)12 Thedistinction between the material bed as it is and as it appears is thus part of a general theory:appearances are qualitatively different from the realities that underlie them, in that appearancesare varied and contradictory while realities are stable and uniform.What are the consequences of this theory for visual art? Plato tells us that the paintercopies the appearance of material objects, not the reality. Why does the painter do so? Becausehe paints what he sees, what appears. To put it another way, he wants to make his paintings looklike what they represent, and what looks like a bed is the “look” of the bed, its appearance. But ifthis is not only distinct from but also qualitatively different from the bed itself, then “realistic”painting, painting that looks like what it represents, must in a deeper sense misrepresent itssubjects. That is, if a viewer is foolish enough to take the painting to show not merely how a bedlooks, but what a bed is really like, the painting will give him false ideas about beds. The point isperhaps clearer in the case of the optical illusions Plato discusses later in Book 10: if two men ofthe same height stand at different distances from a viewer, the further one appears smaller. Heisn’t smaller, of course, but that is how he looks from that particular point of view. A realisticpainter must portray the men “not as they are but as they appear” (598a), copying not the truth(that they are roughly the same size), but the appearance or phantasma that the further one issmaller. If he tries to paint the men as they are and not as they appear, his painting will be“unrealistic”: it will not look like what it represents.1312Compare Paton, “Plato’s Theory of EIKASIA,” 85. Note also that appearances are similar toshadows and reflections in being variable: as one walks around a bed its shadow or reflectionchanges just as much as its appearance.13The Republic thus anticipates the Sophist’s distinction between “likeness-making” (eikastikêeidôlopoiikê) and “phantasm-making” (phantastikê eidôlopoiikê). Likeness-makers preserve theproportions and colors of what they represent, but as for those “who sculpt or draw very largeworks, if they reproduced the true proportions of their beautiful subjects…the upper parts wouldappear smaller than they should, and the lower parts would appear larger, because we see theupper parts from farther away and the lower parts from closer….So don’t these craftsmen saygoodbye to truth, and produce in their images the proportions that seem to beautiful instead of thereal ones?” (Sophist 235e-a, trans. Nicholas P. White). Phantasm-making corresponds to whatRepublic 10 calls imitative art; as for likeness-making, Republic 10 does not explicitly discuss it,but according to the argument I shall offer the poetry that survives censorship in Books 2 and 3,What is Imitative Poetry 7The discussion of painting, then, has illuminated what Plato means by “imitative” art: artthat manages to be compelling and realistic by copying the way things appear, at the cost ofmisrepresenting the way things are. This charge, and the particular way Plato draws thedistinction between realities and appearances – stable and uniform on the one hand, varied andcontradictory on the other – will have significant consequences when we turn to the case ofpoetry and the ethical appearances in which it trades. First we must follow the case of painting,to see what power Plato attributes to art that copies appearances and leaves realities aside.2. DeceptionBook 10’s paradigm of the imitative artist is a man with a mirror, and we are clearly tounderstand the painter as one who emulates the mirror-holder, copying things exactly as he seesthem – exactly as they appear. Of course Plato writes about realistic painting (and not aboutabstract, nonrepresentational, cubist, or expressionist art) because this is what he knew.14 But wemiss the point of his discussion of painting if we overlook the more philosophical reason for hisinterest in realistic painting. Plato wants to make the point that realistic painting has a certainpower over us that makes it, on his view, significantly like (although far less dangerous than)poetry: the power to deceive.…[A] painter can paint us a cobbler, a carpenter, or the other craftsmen, eventhough he knows nothing about these crafts. Nevertheless, if he is a goodpainter, when he has painted a carpenter and displays his painting from far off, hemight deceive children and foolish people by its seeming to be a real carpenter.15(598b-c)On the surface, Plato is making the implausible claim that people are often tricked intobelieving that the painter actually creates the three-dimensional objects he merely represents. Weneed to look beyond this interpretation, however, if we are to find a plausible view, and one thatand the hymns to gods and eulogies of good men that survive in Book 10, would fall under thiscategory.14Greek painters of the time were masters of realism, even of trompe l’oeil: witness the story thatbirds pecked at Zeuxis’ painting of grapes, while Zeuxis tried to lift the painted curtain fromParrhasius’ canvas. For good discussion see E.C. Keuls, Plato and Greek Painting (E.J. Brill,1978).15Here I follow the translation of Burnyeat, “Culture and Society,” 302. The standardtranslations have it that the painter deceives the children and fools “into thinking that it is a realcarpenter.” Both translations are in principle open to either what I will call the implausiblereading or the reading that I will suggest, following Burnyeat and also Belfiore, “Plato’s GreatestAccusation,” but Burnyeat’s translation is overall preferable.What is Imitative Poetry 8is in any way relevant to poetry. We can take our clue about how to do so from the objects ofartistic imitation Plato chooses for his example – craftsmen, knowledgeable experts with the toolsof their trades, as opposed to ordinary people or objects – and from the conclusion he draws fromthe example:Whenever someone announces to us that he has met a man who knows all thecrafts and every thing else that anyone knows, and that there’s nothing that hedoesn’t know more exactly than anyone else, we must suppose that….[thedeceived person] is not able to distinguish between knowledge, ignorance andimitation. (598c-d)The generalization we are to draw from the case of the painted carpenter is not, then, thatimitators deceive us into thinking that they create actual people or tools instead of mere images,but rather that they deceive us into thinking them experts in all sorts of subjects. But whyprecisely does being an imitator – where that is defined as one who copies things as they appearinstead of as they are – afford one a reputation for near omniscience? To see the connection wemust turn to Plato’s distinction between users, makers and imitators (601b ff).The passage is a strange one: the relation of its threefold division to the earlier one(between maker of the form, craftsman, and imitator) is problematic, and it is difficult at first tosee how the passage connects to the overall argument. To interpret it aright, we must keep inmind that it forms the link between the discussion of painting and the discussion of poetry. Itdoes so, I shall argue, by applying the appearance/reality distinction to matters of value.For each thing, Plato says, there are three types of craftsmen: the one who uses it, the onewho makes it, and the one who imitates it. The user is the true expert, for he alone knows whatmakes for a good thing of that kind: “Are not the excellence [or virtue – arête], the fineness [orbeauty – kallos], and the correctness of each implement, living creature, and action related tonothing but the use for which each has been made or begotten?” (601d).16 The maker, guided bythe knowledgeable user, has “right opinion” about whether what he makes is “fine or bad” (601e).The imitator, on the other hand, “will neither know nor have correct belief regarding the finenessor badness of the things he imitates” (602a). Why not? We have learned that the imitator copiesthe mere appearances of things. If he can do so successfully in total ignorance of the value of hisobjects, it must be that value does not appear.The function of a carpenter’s lathe (what it is for) does not meet the eye, but must beunderstood. Since value is dependent on function (601d), it is also the case that much of what16Plato has already argued that excellence is dependent on function at Republic I, 352d ff.What is Imitative Poetry 9makes for a genuinely good lathe does not meet the eye (certainly not the eye of the layman). Butif genuine value is non-apparent, there is something related that does meet the eye: apparentexcellence or fineness, the quality of appearing, not being, excellent or fine. And this, it seems,the imitator does know, for…nevertheless he will imitate, not knowing in what way each thing is bad orgood (ponêron ê khrêston). But the sort of things that appear to be fine/beautifulto the ignorant many, this, it seems, he will imitate. (602b)The true value of a lathe is non-apparent, but a lathe might look to be a good one if it is shiny, orbig, or has a dramatic shape. The point is more compelling in the case of a complicated machinelike a car: one can, with no knowledge of how a car works or what makes for a genuinely goodcar, know just what would make a car look fast or tough to ignorant children – and can thereforemake a picture of what will look to them like an excellent car. (And the children will assume,Plato implies in the passage on the painting of the carpenter, that the person who can make such apicture knows all about cars.)Thus the user/maker/imitator argument, like the discussion of the painted bed, relies onthe distinction between reality and appearances, but with an important difference: there Platodistinguished what is really a bed from the appearance of a bed; here he distinguishes what isreally excellent or kalon (fine or beautiful) from what appears excellent or kalon.17 In both cases,
the imitator copies the appearances instead of the reality (the painter paints what appears to be a
fine or good lathe, knowing nothing about what sort of lathe is fine or good); and in both cases by
so doing the imitator makes work that is “realistic” – persuasive, compelling, and even deceptive.
A painter who knows the truth about lathes could choose a genuinely good one as the subject of
his painting, but if the lathe he portrays lacks the qualities that make lathes appear excellent to the
ignorant, his viewers will not recognize it as a good lathe, and therefore will not think him an
expert in carpentry. His painting will be unpersuasive, as “unrealistic,” although in a different
17
Belfiore interprets Plato as distinguishing between a true standard of the kalon, function or
usefulness, and a false, apparent standard: (aesthetic) pleasure. “The correct standard by which to
judge the virtue and beauty of an artefact is that of function….The imitator, however, and the
children and fools he deceives, judge beauty by the standard of appearance, believing that those
shapes and colors that give pleasure are beautiful….Thus, the pleasingly-shaped hammer made by
the imitator will appear to have a beautiful shape to children and fools. But a true craftsman will
be able to see that such a shape is really not beautiful, for it would be awkward to handle…”
(Belfiore, “Plato’s Greatest Accusation,” 46). I am sympathetic to her conclusions, although the
identification of pleasure with the false standard of beauty and goodness needs more argument
than she provides.
What is Imitative Poetry 10
sense, as the painting that ignores perspective and copies the bed as it is instead of as it appears,
or makes the further man look as big as the near.
Let us represent the analogy between the bed case and the carpenter case as follows:
Form 2nd remove 3rd remove (a) 3rd remove (b)
Form of Bed Material bed Appearance of bed Painting of bed
Form of lathe? 18 Kalon lathe Apparently kalon lathe Painting of
carpenter
With this schema in front of us, we notice one very marked disanalogy between the two
cases. The appearance of a bed supervenes on and is caused by a particular actual bed; an
apparently good lathe, however, floats quite free of any genuinely good lathe. Something can
appear to be good without actually being good; in fact, Plato implies here as so often, the two
qualities rarely coincide.19 Compare two very different senses of ‘apparent’ in English: ‘an
apparently good lathe’ may refer to a good lathe that is manifestly good, or instead to a lathe that
appears to be but is not in fact good. In his talk of apparent value, Plato clearly has the latter
sense in mind.20
This disanalogy notwithstanding, we have very good reasons to take it that Plato does
intend to draw an analogy between bed and apparent bed on one hand and kalon tool and
apparently kalon tool on the other. First, given Plato’s general disparagement of appearances the
distinction between these two senses of ‘apparent’ is not so sharp for him – the appearance of bed
is not a bed, any more than a merely apparently good lathe is a good lathe. Second, as I show
below, this reading makes the example of the carpenter and the distinction between user, maker
and imitator form a link between the discussion of painting and the discussion of poetry.
18
No Form is mentioned in the user/maker/imitator argument, and while in the discussion of the
bed Plato told us that the maker – the carpenter – looks to the Form, this would hardly be
compatible with the present claim that the maker has only “correct belief” about what he makes,
while it is the user who has knowledge (601e). It may be stretching the analogy further than Plato
intended to put any Form here corresponding to the Form of the Bed; perhaps, however, the
relevant Form is the Form of Beauty (the kalon), or of excellence. This would take better account
of the fact that, as I have emphasized, what is really at stake in this argument is knowledge of
value; it would also provide more continuity with the analysis of poetry as I understand it.
19
Compare e.g. Gorgias 464a on the divergence between the good condition (euexia) of a thing
and its seeming (dokousa) good condition.
20
Greek has the resources for clearly marking the distinction between these two senses:
phainesthai with a participle means is manifestly, while phainesthai with an infinitive means
merely appears to be. In the relevant passages from Republic 10 Plato either uses an infinitive
(602b) or uses forms of phainesthai on their own, relying on context or contrasts with forms of
einai (‘to be’) to show that he intends the latter sense (see e.g. 596e, 598a-b, and 602d-e).
What is Imitative Poetry 11
Moreover, if we depart from the immediate context and look to Plato’s thoughts about the
kalon more generally, we find a strong and surprising point of analogy between the two sorts of
appearance. For look how Plato characterizes the difference between genuine and apparent cases
of kallos – beauty or fineness – in Republic 9:
[The democratic city] would seem…to be the most beautiful (kallistê) of the
constitutions. Just like a multicolored cloak embroidered (pepoikilmenon) with
every ornament, so this city, being embroidered with every character, would
appear to be most beautiful. And probably many people would judge it most
beautiful, just as children and women do when they look at multicolored things
(ta poikila). (557c4-9)
The disordered, motley, multicolored democratic city is not beautiful or fine, any more than a
cloak of many different colors. But poikila – multicolored or variegated – things appear beautiful
and fine to people as ignorant as women or children. Below we will see that this term poikilon
has a great deal of ethical significance. If multicolored, variegated things are not truly beautiful,
however, what is? Restricting ourselves for now to visual beauty, we find an answer at Philebus
51b-c: pure colors and simple shapes.21 The genuinely beautiful is simple and uniform; the
apparently beautiful is varied and contradictory. Thus apparently kala things differ from
genuinely kala things in just the same way that the appearance of a bed differs from the material
bed – and in just the same way that the Form of Beauty differs from the many beautifuls. (Here
again, however, we must remember that the analogy is only an analogy: while the Form of Beauty
is absolutely stable and uniform, a genuinely beautiful cloak is only relatively so. Relative to an
apparently beautiful cloak it is stable and uniform; relative to the Form of Beauty it is varied and
full of contradictions.) We can represent the analogy as follows:
Uniform Reality Varied Appearance
Form of Beauty Many beautifuls
Material bed Appearance of bed
Kalon object Apparently kalon object
21
“By the beauty of a shape, I do not mean what the many might presuppose, namely that of a
living being or of a picture. What I mean…is rather something straight or round and what is
constructed out of these with a compass, rule, and square, such as plane figures and solids. Those
things I take it are not beautiful in a relative sense as the others are, but are by their very nature
forever beautiful by themselves….And colors are beautiful in an analogous way” (Philebus 51cd, trans. D. Frede; the colors in question are described as “pure” at 51b.) Here too Plato
distinguishes between what is truly beautiful and what appears beautiful to ordinary people; the
latter is something more complex and varied, like a picture or a person.
What is Imitative Poetry 12
In the visual realm it is not perhaps plausible that only what is varied and contradictory
will appear kalon: it is hard to see why the painted lathe, for example, should fit this description.
We will see below, however, that the objects of poetic imitation must be “multicolored,” varied
and contradictory, in order to appear kalon or otherwise excellent to the audience. Let us turn to
poetry now, after taking stock of the conclusions we have drawn from Plato’s discussion of
painting.
- Even within the ‘realm of becoming’ appearances are distinct from reality.
- Appearances differ from realities, being varied and contradictory while realities are stable and
uniform.
- Therefore imitative art – that is, realistic, persuasive art that copies appearances – necessarily
misrepresents those subjects.
- Therefore one who lacks the knowledge that imitators copy mere appearances (one who lacks
the antidote Plato mentions at 595b) will be deceived, believing both that things truly are as the
imitator presents them, and that the imitator is an expert about his subjects.
3. Ethical Imitation
Now we must determine how to apply Plato’s analysis of imitation to poetry. The painter is an
imitator because he copies a material bed, not the Form of the Bed, and copies the bed as it
appears, not as it is; doing so allows him to deceive foolish people into thinking him an expert.
How can we construct an analogy for poetry? Plato defines the object of poetic imitation as
follows: “human beings doing actions under compulsion or voluntarily, and believing that as a
result of acting they have done well or badly, and in all this either feeling pain or enjoyment”
(603c). So as the painter is to the bed, the poet is to human action. But what could it mean to
say, as we must to complete the analogy and apply the analysis of imitation, that the poet copies
human action as it appears and not as it is? And how does this enable him to deceive his
audience? Plato gives us no explicit answer to these questions. We need to find an interpretation
that not only fits with Plato’s characterization of poetry but also allows us to make sense of the
argumentative structure of Book 10. That is, as I stressed in the Introduction, we need an
interpretation on which it will come out that poetry corrupts because it is a form of imitation,
copying appearances instead of reality – an answer that connects the metaphysical charge against
poetry to the ethical.
One might think that Plato has in mind the following parallel: just as the painter captures
the visible aspect of objects at rest, so the poet captures the visible and audible aspects of humans
in motion (humans acting), and thus just as the painter tricks us into thinking that there is a real
What is Imitative Poetry 13
carpenter on his canvas, so the poet tricks us into thinking that there is a real king grieving or
giving orders on the stage. This, however, is hardly a plausible view about poetry’s powers: the
Greek audience was savvier than that. More significantly, the interpretation fails to connect the
metaphysical charge to the ethical: why should it be corrupting to present the illusion of someone
walking around, especially if it is not particularly corrupting to present the illusion of someone
standing still, as painters do?22
A second interpretation, fairly widespread, holds that the poet captures the appearance
and not the reality of human action in that he captures only “the words and actions” of his
characters; he “does not express, for he does not understand, the principles which underlie those
appearances and which constitute reality,” and thus captures “only the external, not the inner
meaning” of human action.23 This interpretation may capture some of Plato’s thoughts about
poetry, but it cannot explain what he means by calling poetry imitative. First, it is not quite a fair
characterization of poetry: tragedians write soliloquies revealing their character’s inner thoughts
and motivations, and Homer uses narrative to convey the same information. Second, like the first
interpretation we considered, this one too fails to connect the metaphysical charge against poetry
to the ethical. Poets who can accurately copy the appearance or “feel” of behavior can at least in
principle produce convincing copies of good behavior, and thereby present good role models for
the citizens; why should it matter whether they understand what motivates such behavior? Surely
the passages of Homer that Plato lets stand in Book 3 fall under just this description, and perhaps
so too will the hymns to the gods and eulogies of good men that he prescribes in Book 10.
In what follows I offer a very different interpretation of “copying action as it appears,”
one that is in line with the work of Belfiore and Nehamas. In doing so I answer the questions
with which we began in the Introduction: how the analysis of imitation as working at a third
remove from the truth, as well as the discussion of painting, prove relevant to the charge that
poetry corrupts the soul. The account is this: Just as the painter copies what appears to be, but is
not, a bed, the poet copies what appear to be, but are not, instances of human excellence: the
appearance of excellence, apparent excellence.24 Furthermore, apparent human excellence is not
22
Book 3 in fact recommends censorship and supervision of all the arts, but it is clear that Plato
regards poetry as the most dangerous of all.
23
J. Tate, ‘Imitation’ in Plato’s Republic,” Classical Quarterly 22 (1928): 16-23 at 20. Compare
Ferrari: poets “convey the feel of human behaviour, without being possessed of the understanding
from which such behaviour would arise in life” (Ferrari, “Plato and Poetry,” 129).
24
I follow both Belfiore and Nehamas in arguing that Plato complains about poetry because it
presents characters who are in fact vicious but seem excellent to the ignorant audience; I want to
show more clearly than these writers do how this aspect of poetry’s content (the kind of character
it represents) is connected to the fact that such poetry is imitative in form.
What is Imitative Poetry 14
only distinct from genuine human excellence, but also differs from it in a way that precisely
parallels the difference between the apparent bed and the material bed, or between the many
beautiful things and the Form of Beauty: varied, contradictory characters appear excellent, while
true human excellence lies in stability and uniformity of soul. But to be varied and contradictory
in character is in reality to be vicious. Therefore imitative, “realistic” poetry persuades us to take
ignorant poets as experts in human affairs, presents vicious characters as role models, and thereby
corrupts our souls.
The first point to make in defending this interpretation is that on Plato’s view the chief
business of poetry is to present images of human excellence. Just after drawing his conclusions
from the carpenter case about imitation’s power to deceive, Socrates says
After this we must consider both tragedy and its leader, Homer, since we hear
from some people that these men know all the crafts, all human things concerned
with excellence and vice, and the divine things too. (598d-e)
As we read on, it becomes clear that the second of these areas of alleged expertise, “all human
things concerned with excellence and vice,” is the main focus of his criticism. Socrates moves to
pass over a discussion of the crafts, generalizes his claim against Homer by saying that he is
“third from the truth about excellence” (599d), and concludes that imitative poets imitate “images
(eidôla) of excellence and the other things they make poems about” (600e), the other things now
being an afterthought. (Indeed the other two areas of expertise are closely related to this one:
knowledge of crafts is one form of human excellence, and in Book 2 Socrates has described
stories about the gods as “stories told with a view to excellence” (378e).) In general, poetry is
concerned not merely to represent certain ways of acting, but to represent certain ways of acting
as good (and others as bad).
This idea underlies the entirety of the Republic’s discussion of poetry. The censorship of
poetry about gods and heroes, in Books 2 and 3, was premised on the idea that we take poetry’s
heroes as role models: we admire and strive to emulate them.25 (This is just as Protagoras
25
“Nor is it suitable at all to say that gods war and fight and plot against other gods…if indeed
those who will guard our city should consider it most shameful to hate one another easily” (378bc); compare 391e. Conversely, if a poem presents a character as base we tend to disdain his
behavior: “We would be right to censor the lamentations of renowned men, handing them over to
women and not good women either, and to all the bad men, so that those whom we say we are
raising to guard the country will be disgusted by acting like those people” (387e-388a). In Books
2 and 3 the claim that we think good, admire and emulate poetry’s heroes is a crucial (although
implicit) premise of censorship: the young guardians should not for the most part imitate – play
the parts or speak the words of – worthless characters, because by doing so they will come to be
like them; if they do ever imitate bad characters they must do so disdainfully and only “in play”
(396e).
What is Imitative Poetry 15
describes the effect of poetry in the Protagoras: children “learn by heart the poems of good poets,
in which there are many…praises and encomia of the good men of old, so that the child is eager
to imitate them and desires to become like them” (Protag. 325e-326a).) Book 10’s denigration of
poetry is a response to “praisers of Homer who say that this poet educated Greece, and that it is
worthwhile to take up his works for study regarding management and educating in human affairs,
and to live having arranged one’s whole life in accordance with this poet” (606e, emphasis mine):
Socrates compares Homer to the sophists (600c) because he too is viewed as an expert in human
excellence who can teach us how to live.26
There is a wealth of evidence outside the Republic that Plato’s contemporaries thought of
poetry in this way as well. Aristotle’s Poetics gives us an explicit (and uncritical) statement of
the view that poetry’s characters are examples of human excellence: the characters in Homer and
the tragedies are better than we are (Poetics 2.1488a11, 15.1454b9), and tragedy (in contrast with
comedy) represents kala actions of kala characters (Poetics 4.1448b25, compare 15.1454b9).
Aristotle also quotes Sophocles as saying that he depicted people “as they ought to be” (Poetics
25.1460b33). Perhaps the most explicit statement of Plato’s worry comes from Xenophon, where
Niceratus brags that “My father, concerned that I should become a good man, forced me to learn
all of Homer by heart” (Symposium 3.5, cf. IV.6-7).27
We can best understand this view of poetry, and Plato’s criticism of it, if we read phrases
like Aristotle’s “better than us” very broadly. Poets sometimes present their characters as
paragons of the standard virtues (Odysseus is prudent, Achilles brave, Nestor wise), but Plato is
complaining about a more general feature of poetry: that it holds up even its obviously immoral
characters as subjects of awe and admiration. Homer and the tragedians present characters we
would call “larger than life.” We think that in creating them the authors have distilled something
of the essence of human nature. And while we may not easily recognize ourselves in Plato’s
description of poetry’s audience,28 perhaps this way of thinking is not after all so alien to us: we
26
For relevant passages in other dialogues, see Charmides 157e, Laches 191b, and Menexenus
239b, all cited in Halliwell’s commentary on Book 10; Halliwell says that Plato “takes it that one
of the oldest and most basic functions of poetry is to bestow praise on figures who are viewed as
paragons of humanity in some significant respect” (Halliwell, Republic 10, 122-3).
27
Burnyeat comments rightly that the comic context should be taken into account here (Burnyeat,
“Culture and Society,” 306), but the other evidence I cite shows that while Niceratus’ claim may
be meant as parody, it by no means misses it mark.
28
The works of Homer and Hesiod and the tragedians were not objects of study for the elite; they
were instead popular entertainment, and could plausibly be credited with (or blamed for)
influencing and forming popular values and the popular view of human nature. See Burnyeat,
“Culture and Society,” E.A. Havelock, Preface to Plato (Harvard, 1963), N.R. Murphy, The
Interpretation of Plato’s Republic (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1951), and the comparisons between
What is Imitative Poetry 16
might praise a truly fine work of fiction by saying that it shows us, in some way, who we are. If
the poets are thought to be experts in human excellence, it is in part because they seem to be
experts more generally in human nature, or human affairs.
The object of poetic imitation, then, is human action, and in particular excellent human
action. The tragedians and Homer are “imitators of images of excellence and the other things
they write about” (600e). The word translated as “image” here is eidôlon, mere image, the very
word that Plato has used earlier in Book 10 to refer to the appearance of the bed in contrast to the
bed itself (598b). This should indicate that Plato does not mean to say that poets imitate genuine
human excellence as it appears to us or insofar as it is apparent (as Tate would have it). Rather,
just as the painter imitates the appearance of the bed and not the bed itself, the poet imitates
eidôla of excellence instead of genuine excellence. But this is just to say that the poet imitates
apparently excellent characters and actions – that is, whatever characters and actions appear
excellent to the ignorant many.
Now we see in what sense poets imitate the appearance of human action, and we
understand the analogy between painting and poetry:
Form 2nd remove 3rd remove (a) 3rd remove (b)
Form of Bed Material bed Appearance of bed Painting
of bed
Form of lathe? Kalon lathe Apparently kalon lathe Painting of
carpenter
Forms of virtues? Excellent character Apparently excellent character Poem about
character
Very few people know the truth about human excellence or virtue, aretê – the preceding
nine books of the Republic have made this point abundantly clear. Book 10 has told us that the
excellence of any living thing, like that of any tool, is related to its function (compare again
Republic I, 352d ff); without knowledge of the function and nature of the soul, no one can know
what real excellence is, nor whether a particular person is excellent or not. But humans, like
tools, can appear excellent or kalos without really being so, and what makes for apparent
excellence is precisely the province of the imitator. It is the poet more than the painter that Plato
has in mind when he says that the imitator “will imitate…the sort of things that appear to be fine
Plato’s attack on poetry and contemporary attitudes toward televison in A. Nehamas, “Plato and
the Mass Media,” The Monist 71 (1988): 214-34.
What is Imitative Poetry 17
or beautiful to the ignorant many” (602b, quoted above). The poet does not really know what
makes for a skilled doctor, a wise general, a brave soldier, or a just king, but he knows just what
sort of behavior will seem skilled wise, brave and just to popular opinion. This is how a poet like
Homer gains his reputation for knowing “all the crafts and all human things concerned with
excellence and vice” (598d-e). Because his portrayal of a doctor healing a patient impresses the
ignorant audience as capturing precisely what a good doctor would do, they think that Homer
himself knows all about medicine; because he portrays behavior that seems to the audience to
exemplify bravery, justice, wisdom, piety and self-control, they think him an expert in human
excellence, a fit teacher to guide them in living their lives.
The poet, then, presents characters and actions that appear kalon and excellent to the
audience. He does so by imitating the appearance, not the reality, of human excellence. Being
faithful to the appearances, his art is imitative in Plato’s special sense – “realistic,” plausible and
persuasive – and therefore he too can deceive his audience. They think him an expert about
human excellence because he produces images so like what they take to be the real thing.
None of this, however, is enough to show that poetry is ethically harmful. If the
appearance of excellence is relevantly like the reality – if Homer’s Achilles acts more or less like
genuinely brave men would – then imitative poetry may deserve a place in the ideal city, and
cannot be accused of corrupting the soul.29 Is this so? Does poetry present faithful images of
excellence? Or is imitative poetry, like painting, “realistic” and persuasive at the cost of
misrepresenting the reality?
Long before we get to Book 10 we already know that poetry praises people who are in
fact vicious: in Book 2 Adeimantus tells us that poets “account happy and honor vicious
(ponêrous) people who have wealth and other kinds of power” (364a); Book 9 tells us that poets
“praise tyranny as godlike” (568b). In the same Book 2 passage Adeimantus accuses poetry of
perpetrating the very view about morality that the Republic is concerned to disprove: that
injustice is more profitable than justice (364a). This is certainly how things seem to people, but it
is not, Plato argues, how things are.
Now notice how Plato characterizes the difference between genuine human excellence
and the traits admired by the many and praised by the poets, apparent excellence. Virtue, as
defined in Book I, is a harmonious ordering of the soul, in which there are no conflicts or
tensions. In Book 10 Plato emphasizes that such a state is stable and uniform: the virtuous
29
That Plato thinks faithful images of genuinely good characters do deserve some place in the
ideal city is clear from Books 2 and 3. Such images contribute to moral education; how they do
so is an important question, but one that lies outside the scope of this chapter. See Malcolm
Schofield’s chapter in this volume, pp.000-000.
What is Imitative Poetry 18
character is “prudent and peaceful, remaining always nearly the same as itself (phronimon te kai
hêsukhion êthos, paraplêsion on aei auto hautôi)” (604e). This should remind us of the
description of the material bed, in contrast to its appearance, as “differing in no way from itself”
(598a), and the description of the Form of Beauty as “remaining always the same in all respects”
(479a).30
Book 10 describes the genuinely virtuous character in this way only to add that it does
not lend itself to poetic imitation:
[T]he wise and peaceful character, remaining always nearly the same as itself, is
neither easily imitated nor easy to understand when imitated, especially not by a
motley crowd gathered at the theater. For the imitation would be of an
experience alien to them (allotriou…pathous). (604e)
In what sense is genuine virtue an “alien experience” to most people, and thus not an easy subject
of imitation? It cannot be merely that most people have not had the experience of being prudent
and peaceful, for neither have they had the experience of being a general or a king or Electra, and
it is imitations of these characters that they most enjoy. Rather we should hear ‘alien’ in
something closer to the Brechtian sense. A story whose hero is quiet and imperturbable, reacting
to fortune’s blows not with passion and drama but with calm reasoning and utter self-control,
leaves the mass audience as cold as would an abstract painting of a bed. The peaceful character
simply does not “look like” a hero – someone “better” than us, kalos, larger than life, admirable,
exciting, worth watching – any more than a painting that tries to copy the reality of a bed by
ignoring perspective and foreshortening will look like a bed. Poetry that copies the reality instead
of the appearance of virtue will leave the audience puzzled, distanced, bored, and in no way
inclined to think the author an expert in human excellence. The claim that the virtuous character
is difficult to imitate, then, must rest on the view that the reality of human excellence is very
different from the appearance.
What then, is apparent excellence like – what sort of character appears excellent? It must
be the one Plato contrasts to the genuinely virtuous character by describing as eumimêton, easily
imitated – the kind of character people admire, enjoy watching, and consider a plausible hero.
This character Plato characterizes as “irritable and multicolored (aganaktêtikon te kai poikilon)”
30
It is important to note that the virtuous character is only paraplêsion to itself – nearly the same,
very similar – while the unchanging unity of the Form is absolute. As Plato says later in Book
10, our souls are never perfect when embodied (611b ff.). The virtuous soul is as good, as
uniform, and as stable as an embodied soul can be, but nonetheless falls far short of the ideal.
What is Imitative Poetry 19
(605a5) – stormy, passionate, emotional, full of inner conflict, subject to varied moods and
changing desires. Such a character is in fact the very contrary of the virtuous character – it is
vicious.31 But this is precisely the kind of character Homer and the tragedians choose as their
heroes: hotheads, lamenters, passionate lovers, wily plotters, wrathful avengers.
Looking back to the discussion of poetry and music in Books 2 and 3, we find Plato
making much the same charge. Genuine excellence is stable and uniform, or as Plato here puts it
“simple” (haploun), and art should represent it as such.32 Popular art, however, tends to represent
gods and heroes as changeable, varied, full of contradictions and multicolored variety.33 Here
Plato applies this criticism to the style as well as content of representation: the style of narrative
suitable for representing a virtuous person has “little variation,” but people much prefer hearing
the style that has “motley forms of variation” 397b-c; later he contrasts meters and rhythms
appropriate to an “orderly and courageous life” to ones that are multicolored (poikilous) and
varied (pantodapas) (399e-400a). In general, “simplicity (haplotês) in music and poetry” is
beneficial (404e), but variety conforms to popular taste.34
Genuine excellence and the beneficial art that copies it is “simple” (haploun); the
character that appears excellent, and thus the art that copies apparent excellence, is
“multicolored” (poikilon). This latter word echoes throughout the Republic: in the passages from
book 3 quoted above, in Book 10 where both the “easily imitated” character and the poet’s
imitations of him are multicolored (604e, 605a), and in Book 9 where Socrates tells us that
women and children foolishly think multicolored things beautiful or fine (557c, quoted above). It
is worth noting that poets used this very word to characterize their heroes: Hesiod’s Prometheus
is poikilos, as is Aeschylus’; Euripides uses the same word for his Odysseus, while Homer’s
Odysseus is poikilomêtês – “muliticolor-minded.”35 Indeed Homer’s Odysseus is a paradigm of a
varied and contradictory character presented as hero: he is the man of many wiles and many
tricks, polutropos, polumêkhanos, polumêtis, anything but haplous.
31
The democratic character type, second in vice and misery only to the tyrannical, is called
poikilon at 561e; the Laws refers to vicious characters as “multicolored and base (êthê kai poikila
kai phaula)” (Laws 704d).
32
The just person is called haploun at 361b, a god at 380d; for passages describing good art as
haploun see below.
33
Poetry represents gods as appearing in many shapes, but in reality a god retains one and the
same shape, being simple (haploun, 380d). Poets represent Achilles (a hero and the son of a
goddess) as full of turmoil (391c), but a true god-like hero is stable and calm.
34
Even “polyharmonic or multistringed instruments” – the flute first among them – are ruled out
in favor of simple ones (399c).
35
Hesiod’s Theogony 511, Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound 310, Euripides’ Iphigenia at Aulis 526,
Homer’s Iliad 11.482 and Odyssey 3.163.
What is Imitative Poetry 20
Plato’s criticisms imply, then, that appearances in the realm of human affairs differ from
reality in just the same way that we have seen appearances differing from reality throughout. Let
us add this to our chart as follows:
Uniform Reality Varied Appearance
Form of Beauty Many beautifuls36
Material bed Appearance of bed
Kalon object Apparently kalon object
Excellent character Apparently excellent character
Now we see the ethical payoff of the discussion of painting, and the relevance of the
user/maker/imitator argument. We also have a solution to the problem that has vexed many
commentators as to whether Plato contradicts himself by allowing poetry that imitates virtuous
characters in Book 3, but condemning all imitative poetry in Book 10. Imitative poetry is
“realistic” poetry: it copies things as they appear, not as they are. In particular it copies virtue as
it appears, i.e. apparent virtue, presenting varied, contradictory, dazzling heroes. Poetry that
copies the reality of virtue (that is, presents images of stable, uniform characters) – like the
passages of Homer that survive censorship in Book 3, and the “hymns to gods and eulogies of
good men” allowed into the city in Book 10 (607a) – may well include imitations of characters,
but it is not “imitative” in the technical sense Book 10 defines: it copies things as they are, not as
they appear.37
Now we are also, almost, ready to answer the question with which we began: what is the
relation between the metaphysical charge that imitative poetry is at a third remove from the truth,
36
Timaeus 50d calls the entire realm of becoming, the perceptible realm, multicolored – poikilon.
37
Contra Adam (see his note on 607a) and the many who agree with him that Plato defines all
poetry, and indeed all art, as imitative. I thus side with Tate, Ferrari, Janaway, Nehamas and
others who allow Books 3 and 10 to be consistent by arguing for a distinction between imitation
on the one hand and imitativeness on the other, and stressing that Plato condemns only
imitativeness. Each, like me, defines imitativeness in such a way that poets (or actors) who
imitate only good characters are not thereby imitative: Ferrari, Janaway and Nehamas argue that
to be imitative is to enjoy imitation for its own sake or to enjoy imitating anything whatsoever,
regardless of its worth; Tate argues that to be imitative is to copy what is at a second remove from
truth instead of the Forms. I prefer my solution in that it is more closely tied to the metaphysical
analysis of imitation and the discussion of painting. My solution does still leave us with an
inconsistency: imitation is defined as copying things as they appear, not as they are, in Book 10,
but is indiscriminate between copying appearances and copying realities in Books 2 and 3. This
seems to me a blatant, but not very problematic, inconsistency in Plato’s text: we can allow that
Plato introduces a technical sense of ‘imitation’ in Book 10, while using the term more broadly in
the earlier books; after all, the more technical sense relies on metaphysical distinctions not
introduced until Books 5-7.
What is Imitative Poetry 21
and the ethical charge that it “puts a bad constitution” in the soul? To complete the answer – and
to get a full view of Republic 10 – we need to put in place the psychological side of the story.
IV. Corrupting the Soul
Poetry that encourages us to admire and emulate vicious characters surely does no ethical good.
But Plato’s accusation is more specific: imitative poetry harms us by “putting a bad constitution”
into our souls (605b) – that is, by strengthening an inferior part of the soul and thereby weakening
or overthrowing the rule of reason. If this charge is to stand, Plato must show that just insofar as
poetry is imitative, it targets and gratifies an inferior part of the soul. But here the argument of
Book 10 may seem to involve a serious non sequitur.
Socrates asks over what part of the soul imitation exerts its power at 602c; he begins his
answer by examining a class of visual appearances that stand out as mere appearances: optical
illusions. A person can know how things really are and yet still experience an illusion: a
submerged stick looks bent even when one knows it is straight. Plato takes this to show that two
distinct parts of the soul are at work in such cases: the rational part, whose beliefs are sensitive to
reasoning and calculation, and some other part, unreasoning and base,38 which believes that
things are as they appear.39 Because painters show things as they appear (the painter paints the
submerged stick as bent, the more distant man as smaller), he concludes that visual imitation
appeals to this inferior, appearance-receptive part of the soul.
Then he turns to poetry. The discussion makes no overt reference to appearances or
illusions of any kind: instead it describes the kind of characters and situations imitative poetry
tends to represent. Socrates even warns his interlocutors not to rely on the analogy with painting
in determining what part of the soul poetry affects (603b). He proceeds to describe our responses
to poetry as appetitive and emotional, in ways strongly reminiscent of his earlier characterization
of the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul.40 But the conclusion he draws at the end of the
38
It is one of the base (phaula) things in us (603a); it is “far from wisdom” (phronêsis, 603a) and
it is “thoughtless” (anoêton, 605b).
39
602c-603b. The conclusion is established by an application of the principle of opposites, the
same principle Plato used to establish the division of the soul in Book 4. The argument relies on
some questionable presuppositions, in particular that when the stick looks bent one (in part)
believes that it is bent.
40
Most explicitly: “concerning sexual desires and anger (thumou) and all the appetitive desires
and pains and pleasures in the soul….poetic imitation….nurtures these things, watering them
although they should wither, and sets them up to rule in us although they should be ruled” (606d).
Plato also describes this part of the soul as one that “hungers for the satisfaction of weeping and
sufficiently lamenting, being by nature such as to have appetites for these things (epithumein), is
the part that is satisfied and delighted by the poets” (606a, emphasis mine); he describes the type
What is Imitative Poetry 22
discussion is that imitative poetry affects the very part of the soul that is taken in by optical
illusions:
The imitative poet instills a bad constitution in the private soul of each person,
gratifying the part of the soul that is thoughtless and doesn’t distinguish the
bigger from the smaller, but supposes that the same things are at one time large
and another time small. (605b-c)41
How does Plato reach this conclusion, and what does it mean? How is watching a
tragedy or listening to Homer psychologically parallel to experiencing an optical illusion; how for
example is “hungering for weeping and wailing” parallel to seeing a submerged stick as bent?
The connection has seemed to most interpreters obscure or absurd.42 But the account developed
above resolves the mystery: in describing the passionate, dazzling, varied, conflicting characters
and actions imitative poetry represents, Plato takes himself to be showing that such poetry
imitates ethical appearances. A straight stick submerged in water appears bent; likewise a
multicolored character appears kalon and excellent to us, human affairs appear important (604d),
and an event like the death of a son appears obviously bad (603e ff; Plato calls such events
seeming evils” (dokounta kaka) at 613a). A passage from the Phaedo (69b) is helpful here: what
most people think of as virtue (and thus what imitative poetry represents) is in fact only a
skiagraphia of virtue – a shadow-painting, something akin to trompe l’oeil. Plato classes
skiagraphiai with optical illusions at Republic 602d.43 Imitative painting trades in visual
of character naturally akin to poetic imitation as “irritable and multicolored” (605a), where
previously he has used such terms to characterize spirit and appetite, respectively. Commentators
have wished to resist the conclusion that spirit or appetite is at issue here, because they think it
improbable that either of these parts could be involved in optical illusions. The argument I give
in what follows should make Plato’s strong implication that appetite and spirit are intended far
more palatable.
41
The illusion-believing part of the soul first sees a man close by and believes that he is large,
then sees him at a distance and believes that he is small.
42
Nehamas speaks for many here: “Why should our desire tell us that the immersed stick is
bent?” (Nehamas, “Plato on Imitation and Poetry,” 265). He goes on to argue that some hitherto
unmentioned subdivision of reason is intended. The basis for this reading (shared by Burnyeat,
“Culture and Society,” and others) is a difficult passage at 602e which seems to imply that the
stick appears bent to the rational part of the soul; there are readings of 602e, however, which
avoid this unpalatable conclusion (see e.g. Adam, The Republic of Plato, vol. 2, 408 and 466-7).
For fuller discussion of this passage, Republic 10’s argument, and the connection between
appearances and the non-rational soul, see my “Pleasure and Illusion in Plato,” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, forthcoming
43
See also Republic 586b-c, where Plato describes the impure pleasures of the many as shadowpainted images (eidôla eskiagraphêmena) of the true pleasures of the philosopher, and Laws 663c
What is Imitative Poetry 23
illusions, imitative poetry in ethical illusions. Thus the passionate emotions provoked by
imitative poetry are to be understood as responses to vivid appearances of things as good or bad,
wonderful or terrible. Hence Plato’s sharp contrast between indulging these emotions on the one
hand and rational calculation on the other: weeping and wailing at the death of one’s son, like
believing that a submerged stick is bent, means assenting to the way things appear instead of
using rational calculation to determine how things really are.44
Thus realistic, imitative poetry caters to the appearance-responsive, non-rational soul,
while poets who present “quiet and moderate” characters, like painters who present true
proportions, fail to present things as they appear and thus fail to engage this part of the soul. Now
that we have the psychological side of this story in place, we can see why imitative poetry is so
worrisome to Plato – that is, why on his account it has such influence and power. First, it is this
non-rational part of the soul that tends to dominate in most people. The earlier books of the
Republic showed us that reason rules the souls only of the few (the virtuous, the philosophic):
most people are ruled by appetite or spirit. However precisely Plato intends to identify Book 10’s
“inferior part of the soul” (603a) with appetite or spirit, here too he holds that most people are
ruled not by reason but by the irrational passions, desires and prejudices that oppose it. Second,
this “hungering,” “insatiable” part of the soul (604d, 606a) feels intense pleasure when gratified.
Poetry that caters to its desires for emotional release is thus called “the poetry aiming at pleasure
and imitation,” where these seem to be equivalent descriptions (607c).45 The intense pleasure
where ordinary, corrupt notions of justice and injustice are like shadow-paintings viewed from a
flawed perspective.
44
The reason-led person is “measured” in his grief (603e) and holds back from lamentation
because he follows “calculation” (604d); note that measurement and calculation are precisely the
tools that reason employs in combating optical illusions (602d-603a). Ethical “calculation”
includes the thought that “it is unclear what is good and bad in such things [e.g. the death of one’s
son]” (604b): although the death of a son certainly appears to be bad, just as the stick in water
appears to be bent, reason does not simply accept this appearance. The rational man also
calculates that “human affairs are not worth great seriousness” (604b-c): here reason puts his
pains into perspective, just as it corrects for effects of distance in matters of sight. Nussbaum
argues that one of Plato’s main complaints against tragedy is that it represents good people
genuinely suffering from the blows of fortune, while on the Socratic view a good person cannot
be harmed (M.C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, (Cambridge, 1986): we can understand
this as the complaint that poetry fails to distinguish what merely appears bad (human misfortune)
from what is genuinely bad. For good discussion of the parallels between visual perception and
emotional reactions, see Belfiore, “Plato’s Greatest Accusation,” Ferrari, “Plato and Poetry,” and
N. White, A Companion to Plato’s Republic (Hackett, 1979).
45
Compare “If you let in the pleasurable muse in lyric or epic poetry, pleasure and pain will be
kings in your city” (607a). The Gorgias puts the point very clearly: tragedy is a form of flattery,
for it aims “only to gratify the spectators,” has no qualms about “saying something pleasant and
What is Imitative Poetry 24
imitative poets provide, along with the persuasive realism that makes them seem to be experts,
puts ordinary people fully in their sway. (That emotional responses are so vivid, powerful, and
pleasurable, should help to explain why imitative poetry is so dangerous while painting, although
it targets the same part of the soul, is less so.)
Most worrisomely to Plato – the “greatest charge” against poetry – the pleasures of
imitative poetry are so strong that they threaten to upset the order even of a “decent” person’s
soul (605c). Here it is crucial to recognize that, as we have shown, the pleasures poetry offers us
are not the cheap thrills of pulp fiction or “trash.” Imitative poetry offers us compelling portraits
of human affairs and human excellence – compelling because they are realistic, i.e. they capture
these things as they appear. In so doing such poetry gives us the emotional satisfaction of
identifying, grieving, and rejoicing with its heroes. When we understand Plato’s criticisms we
see how closely they apply to the very features that make us value Homer and Sophocles, and
Shakespeare and Dostoevsky too. Recall the distinction above between simple (excellent) and
multicolored (apparently excellent) characters, and the corresponding distinction between simple
(non-imitative) and multicolored (imitative) art. What we call “great literature” is rarely simple:
it is complex and varied, rich in detail, in subtlety and even in contradictions. It presents
characters who undergo change (think of the charge that a book lacks “character development”),
who hold our interest by feeling deep conflict and struggling over what to do, whose human
weaknesses allow us to learn from them and whose passions let us sympathize with them. In the
visual realm Plato leaves us pure colors and simple shapes (Philebus 51b-c, quoted above); in
literature, as he makes quite clear in Book 3, he leaves us steady, quiet characters persuading each
other with reason, and enduring calmly in the face of trials.46 Imagine an Iliad cast only with
Nestors, or a sane, dispassionate Hamlet with no taste for revenge. Or imagine a protagonist who
accepts imminent death calmly, and spends his last hours engaged in quiet, rational persuasion.
This last makes for excellent Platonic dialogue – but does it give even the most highbrow among
us what we want from art?47
gratifying to them but corrupting,” and refuses to say what is “unpleasant but beneficial”
(Gorgias 502b).
46
See 389e-390d.
47
Burnyeat holds out hope that the “hymns to the gods and encomia of good men” allowed into
the city at 607a will include “engaging narratives” and “adventure stories” (Burnyeat, “Culture
and Society,” 278). This may be right, but Plato clearly recognizes that the poetry he
countenances lacks the pleasures of the poetry he condemns: “the more poetic and pleasing”
poems are “the less they should be heard” (387b); the multicolored style is most pleasant (397d),
but the simple one is more beneficial (398a); the poet who will be admitted to the ideal city is
“more austere and less pleasure-giving” than the poets who will be expelled (398a-b). The
What is Imitative Poetry 25
V. Conclusion
Now at last we have our solution to the problem with which we began. How is the metaphysical
charge against poetry, that it is a form of imitation and thus at a third remove from the truth,
related to the ethical charge, that it corrupts the soul? Imitative art copies appearances instead of
realities, and therefore is “realistic” – persuasive and compelling, able to deceive the audience
into thinking the artist an expert in his subjects. Imitative poetry copies appearances of human
affairs, and of human excellence in particular. But these appearances differ drastically from the
reality: being varied and contradictory instead of stable and uniform, the apparently excellent
character is in fact a model of vice. The audience is deceived by the “realistic” portrayal: they
admire and emulate the hero as a paragon of excellence, and take the author to be an expert in
human excellence, an expert about how one should live. The spell is all the stronger and more
pernicious in that poetry’s appearances influence and gratify the non-rational part the soul, a part
that experiences powerful and disruptive pleasure. By gratifying this part of the soul poetry
strengthens it; thus the audience’s rational thought is crippled, and their souls are harmed.
Lastly, we have seen that Plato’s argument against poetry in Republic 10 is far more
substantial than it first appears. He is not merely making the complaint that various influential
poets happen to write ethically harmful poetry. Rather he has presented an argument, based on
metaphysical and psychological theory, that only ethically harmful poetry – poetry that reflects
and reinforces the flaws in popular morality – can compel us and move us with its portrayal of
human affairs. Persuasive, pleasing, poikilon (multicolored) poetry has what beneficial but
austere haploun (simple) poetry lacks: the power over ordinary people that makes poetry a matter
of such concern to Plato in the first place, and the power over even a Plato or a Socrates that
make them wish it could be redeemed.48
question whether Plato means his own dialogues to be poetry of a sort is an important one: see the
discussion of “anti-tragic theatre” in Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness.
48
See the lover’s farewell to poetry at 607c-608a, Socrates’ avowal of love for Homer at 595b,
and Plato’s frequent quotation of Homer and other poets throughout the dialogues.